I first learned about the “Just War Theory” during my sophomore year in college. As an 18 year old male with a draft card in my wallet and a war raging in Vietnam, I had a personal stake in knowing what the Church taught about war, military service, and conscientious objection.
In the 45 years since, I have written and lectured about the Just War Theory (JWT) countless times. Often I have found that my Catholic audience was not well enough informed about JWT to make it a practical tool for citizens to form their moral judgments about any specific war policy.
Moreover I have had to point out that, while JWT’s purpose is to impose moral limits on war, it has never actually prevented one. But we may be getting closer to the day when it will—and the Syria crisis illustrates how.
First, some preliminary remarks about the theory itself:
Developed over 15 centuries beginning with Saint Augustine, JWT evolved as an alternative moral framework to both Christian pacifism (espoused by Jesus and the earliest Christians, and still embraced by millions of Christians today) and the anything-goes “Holy War/Crusades” approach (which the Church now rejects). JWT represents a kind of middle ground between a prohibition of all wars and a “carte blanche” for any war.
This theory presumes that peace is always our moral imperative, and that going to war must always be justified as an exception to the rule. The burden of proof is on those who argue for war, since the moral presumption is ALWAYS in favor of peace.
The theory aims not simply to determine whether a war is “justified,” but whether it is morally lawful—after all, the Latin word “JUS,” from which we get “justice,” means “LAW.”
To justify a war as morally lawful, any military action must meet two different sets of conditions: jus ad bellum (conditions to justify going to war), and jus in bello (conditions to justify the conduct of that war). To claim that one is engaged in a “just war” one must argue that all of the conditions in both sets are being met at every stage of the war.
Some scholars argue that the conditions set by JWT should not be applied as a simple “checklist,” but increasingly public figures are doing just that, and to good effect. In the Syria crisis, leaders from Barack Obama to the U.S. Congress to the UN to Vladimir Putin have all cited elements of JWT to support their positions. The overall result has been to force a sharper debate with clearer objectives and finally a more restrained approach that has made war less likely.
A brief check of some major portions of JWT illustrates this.
Just Cause? Self-defense is the only just cause for war that is formally recognized in modern international law. This does not apply to a U.S. intervention in Syria.
But recent conflicts have also raised the possibility of a new just cause—“humanitarian intervention”—where events harming innocent people within a sovereign state justify foreign intervention.
Discrimination? JWT requires that non-combatants must remain immune from attack. Thus killing soldiers may be justified, but not killing babies. Hence the prohibition against weapons of mass destruction in general, and chemical weapons in particular: they kill everyone without discrimination.
But while JWT prohibits our use of such weapons, it does not authorize attack on those who do. This raises again the question of humanitarian intervention. Do we have the right to use violence to prevent the use of prohibited weapons in order to protect civilians?
Thus, in targeting chemical weapons while refusing to back the rebels in Syria’s civil war, Obama was pushing the boundaries of JWT (which may now accept humanitarian intervention) without going beyond them (JWT does not accept intervening in civil war).
Lawful Authority? Since Pearl Harbor, Congress’ constitutional authority to declare war has been ignored - - a breach of JWT. By going to Congress, Obama made a gesture toward the rule of law. But those who insisted on the support of the U.N. also had JWT on their side, since it requires any use of arms to be authorized by the relevant authorities, and international law makes intervening in a sovereign state a U.N. matter.
Reasonable Hope of Success? U.N. inspector David Kay has admitted that, despite his skepticism, past attempts to deter a nation’s use of chemical weapons by force of arms have been effective; he now regrets we did not stop Saddam Hussein’s chemical attacks and believes we could use force of arms to stop Syria.
Last Resort? All peaceful means of addressing conflict must be tried until exhausted, before one may justify recourse to war.
When people cry “America is not the world’s cop,” they are correct. But JWT argues that violence against another state may be justifiable precisely because the world does not have an international police system that can enforce international law. (Technically, resolutions of the U.N. Security council are legally binding, but have often proven unenforceable.)
Still, stepping into that vacuum to play “temporary cop” cannot be justified until all other means are exhausted. Thus Russia’s insistence on U.N. action and a diplomatic compromise were, ironically, truer to JWT than the U.S. proclamation that the UN was useless.
Don’t forget: if the U.S. had waited in 2003 for U.N. inspectors to finish looking for WMDs in Iraq, the entire Iraq war could have been avoided.
Proportionality? Would intervention do more harm than good? Here strong arguments surfaced on both sides. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta thinks a strike against Syria would accomplish the goal of preventing more chemical weapons attacks, but former Defense Secretary Robert Gates said a strike would be like ‘‘throwing gasoline on an extremely complex fire in the Middle East.”
In case we have forgotten the lesson of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan should have reminded us that predicting war outcomes is notoriously difficult. This makes the last resort rule that much more binding.
So letting the U.N. inspectors finish their work (recording on September 16 the evidence against the Syrian government) and waiting for a U.N. resolution both reflect compliance with JWT.
All in all, it seems that many participants evoked pieces of JWT to back their positions.
Ironically, the overall effect was to promote JWT itself and reduce the threat of further U.S. War--despite the political fallout: lower polls for Obama, disgruntled Congress members in both parties, mixed results for U.S. diplomats like UN Ambassador Samantha Power and Secretary of State John Kerry, a political coup for Putin, a reprieve for Syria’s Assad, and a setback for the rebels.
Ironically, the overall effect was to promote JWT itself and reduce the threat of further U.S. War--despite the political fallout: lower polls for Obama, disgruntled Congress members in both parties, mixed results for U.S. diplomats like UN Ambassador Samantha Power and Secretary of State John Kerry, a political coup for Putin, a reprieve for Syria’s Assad, and a setback for the rebels.
It is impossible to imagine the diplomatic solution that emerged last weekend if the principles of JWT had not been invoked by so many parties.
It is too soon to know how all this will play out in Syria, but for the longer run at least three things seem clear: (1) none of this promises to end the civil war raging in Syria; that crisis remains untouched; (2) the case against chemical weapons is now stronger than ever (Syria now admits having them and agrees to give them up and sign the international convention prohibiting them); (3) the basic terms of the Catholic Just War Theory are becoming the common currency of public discourse on war.
The just war theory is no longer the Church’s intellectual property, of course. No one ever copyrighted it. But on the day JWT actually prevents a war (and Syria might provide that day), the Catholic Church will have made a profound historical contribution to the cause of world peace—whether anyone notices and not!
© Bernard F. Swain PhD 2013
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