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WELCOME! CrossCurrents aims to provoke thought and enrich faith by interpreting current events in the light of Catholic tradition. I hope you find these columns both entertaining and clarifying. Your feedback and comments are welcome! See more about me and my work at http://home.comcast.net/~bfmswain/onlinestorage/index.html or contact me directly at bfswain@juno.com NOTE: TO READ OR WRITE COMMENTS, CLICK ON THE TITLE OF A POST.

Showing posts with label Supreme Court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Supreme Court. Show all posts

Friday, May 12, 2017

#465: Time Is Running Out for Roe v. Wade

  Roe v. Wade was always a ticking time bomb, and although it’s had a very long fuse, it’s about to go off.


No, I’m not talking about the prospect of a conservative SCOTUS majority overturning the case. I’m talking about the natural outcome of the case itself.

Two major features characterized the legal argument of the majority in Roe v. Wade.  First was the idea that privacy was an implied right under the US Constitution which protected women from the intrusion of government.  Second, it determined that the “viability” of the fetus was the dividing line between the woman’s private interest before viability, and the state’s interest after.

Of course, there were two risky implications in using the idea of “viability.” First, determining when was “before” and when was “after” might prove to be difficult.  And in fact the court chose an arbitrary method: it divided pregnancy into trimesters, and determined that the first was “before,” the third trimester was “after,” and the second trimester was someplace in between.

The second risk is that the very idea of “viability” was, in reality, a sliding scale, a moving target.  The court decided Roe v Wade in 1973, when fetuses rarely survived outside a mother until the third trimester--that is, after 24 weeks.  A fetus born prematurely at six months almost surely died.

As time passed, however, and medical technology and prenatal care evolved, early births received better and better treatment, and premature babies survived at younger and younger ages.  By the 21st century, it was common for babies born at 24 weeks and even younger--that is, in the second trimester--to survive.  Babies born at 24 weeks now have a 40% chance of survival, and babies born at 23 weeks still have a 17% chance of survival.  This represents a remarkable shift in “viability” in the 44 years since Roe v. Wade.
 But now comes a much more dramatic development, with the recent report of the invention of an artificial womb. (https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/04/preemies-floating-in-fluid-filled-bags/524181/) Until now, the device has been used only with baby lambs, but the inventors reported it would soon be available to assist “premature babies.”

To be this seems to be a case of under-reporting.  For if we’re really going to have an artificial womb, the implications go far beyond what we now think of as premature babies.  Such a device potentially offers the prospect of bringing fetuses to term in pregnancies much shorter than the current “viability” limit:

Within a decade or so, babies born between 23 and 25 weeks might not be thrust into the harsh outside world at all. Instead, they may be immediately plunged into a special bag filled with lab-made amniotic fluid, designed to help them gestate for another month inside an artificial womb.

--the Atlantic April 25, 2017


The current device is quite primitive, but will surely evolve. Dear reader, imagine the practical impact of a device that could, for example, offer survivability to a fetus in mid-or even early second trimester.

This impact was explored long ago in a hypothetical discussion that was part of a popular Boston TV show called “Miller’s Court.”

Arthur Miller, a Harvard law professor (now at NYU law school), used the program from 1979-1988 to discuss legal issues in a quasi-courtroom forum, usually cross examining several panelists at once.

On the occasion I have in mind, the issue under discussion was abortion.  The panel included then- Congressman Barney Frank and feminist writer Gloria Steinem.

Miller posed this hypothetical question: suppose that an artificial womb could be used to bring a fetus to term AFTER the pregnancy was terminated by abortion. Would that mean that the mother would lose her legal standing, and the state would gain a legal interest in preserving the child’s life? Both Barney Frank and Gloria Steinem agreed that to be the case. They said yes: at that point the state could act to save the child, and the mother’s right to decide would be gone (presumably because her privacy right had ended).

Two noteworthy points here: first, Frank and Steinem were answering a really hypothetical question, which at the time (the mid-1980s) had no practical importance.  Second, it was nonetheless stunning to hear two such prominent pro-choice advocates take the position they took. In effect, they were limiting the women’s control over the effects of her choice, once the fetus was outside her body.

You see, this discussion revealed a generally overlooked element about abortion itself.  It demonstrated that an abortion is really two events at once: it is the termination of a pregnancy, and it is the death of a fetus.  Generally, these two events are inevitably connected; one cannot choose one without the other.  And so most discussions about abortion jumble the two together, with pro-lifers opposing the killing, and pro-choicers defending the woman’s right to end her pregnancy.  In such discussions, the two sides inevitably talk past each other--which is exactly what has been happening for more than 40 years.

But Miller’s hypothesis opens the possibility of speaking of these two elements separately.  In other words, what if women could terminate a pregnancy without killing the child?  Then what?

What Frank and Steinem were essentially agreeing to was the idea that, if it were possible to terminate pregnancy without causing a death, then the resulting life would become a matter, not of the mother’s privacy, but a matter of public interest.  At that point, the state could take over the attempt to save the child.

But if Miller’s hypothesis highlighted the basic fact that abortion does 2 things (terminates a pregnancy, but also kills the fetus)--now it seems the hypothesis itself may soon become real. For now we DO have an artificial womb, and now it may soon be possible to terminate pregnancy yet save the fetus!

What this means that the artificial womb completely explodes the notion of “viability” built into Roe v. Wade.

It opens the prospect that women can retain the right to choose an abortion, but lose the right to kill their fetus.  Since that latter right depends on the location of the fetus within the woman’s body, the artificial womb opens up the entirely new horizon of allowing the fetus to survive outside woman’s body, where a mother no longer has legal jurisdiction.

Depending on how effective the artificial womb is, and how quickly it evolves, this could mean that many abortion cases which are currently treated as private under Roe v. Wade could become legally controversial under the same case.  For example, what if a woman’s partner (or mother or father or sister or brother) sues to save the child using an artificial womb?  What if a state attorney general sues to enjoin any pregnancy longer than, say 12 weeks, to be subject to state review and intervention? 

None of this would require a reversal of Roe v. Wade.  Theoretically, it could lead to cases where the woman has her abortion but the child survives. 

Not only would this prevent many deaths, but it would also pose a new challenge for both the pro life and pro choice communities.  For pro-lifers, it would mean reconsidering their attitude to abortion itself, recognizing a woman’s right to terminate the pregnancy as long as someone else takes responsibility for saving the child.  For pro-choices, it would pose a difficult challenge: acknowledging that a woman’s right to choose extends only to the termination of pregnancy, not to the fate of the child produced by the pregnancy.  In individual cases, this could mean that a woman might choose to abort with the knowledge that her child survive, and grow, and live in the same world she does, without her consent, and without any legal recourse.  In other words, this could mean that choosing abortion means relinquishing any voice over the future life of one’s own child.

None of this represents a change in abortion itself.  None of this represents a change in Roe v. Wade.  This would simply be a long-term final outcome of a time-bomb decision that has been ticking away for more than 40 years.  And it would finally bring to surface the long overlooked reality that abortion is two things at once, and that each side of this long and anguished debate has been arguing about only one of them, and ignoring the other.

Would this mean the end of the debate?  I suspect not.  Would it make people happier?  I suspect neither side would be fully satisfied, since one side would continue to object to the first trimester abortions, and the other side would feel that somehow a woman’s freedom was being curtailed.

But even if the debate continued and both sides remain unhappy, one thing is sure: Sunday, somewhere, each of us might well meet someone who owes their life to an artificial womb, and who can say to us “I am an abortion survivor.”
 © Bernard F. Swain PhD 2017

Friday, February 19, 2016

#447: Why Justice Scalia’s “Original” Genius Is a Bad Guide for Catholics

The death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia reminds us that how we interpret the past also guides us into the future—but his method is less helpful for the Church’s future. 

Any official document that guides a people must be interpreted, so that people know what it means.  And once the authors die, the task of interpreting falls to others. That is why we have the U.S. Supreme Court: to interpret the charter we call the U.S. Constitution. And the tributes following the sudden death of Justice Antonin Scalia make it clear that, for his contribution to how the Supreme Court functions, Scalia can arguably be ranked the most important Italian-Catholic in American history (with all due respect to Columbus and Frank Sinatra).

Scalia’s famous method for interpreting the Constitution was labeled either “originalism” or “textualism.” Either way, the strategy was to detect the true meaning of the Constitution in the words of the text itself, the legislation, without the “legislative history” (ideas, influences, sources, historical conditions or developments).

This strategy grew from Scalia‘s broader convictions.  Son of an academic, graduate of a Jesuit high school and college, trained in philosophy and theology and classical western culture, he developed deep respect for the rule of law, and a healthy suspicion that human nature often seeks to avoid or rationalize the demands of law into something more to our liking.

For Scalia, law reflects the agreements people reach to achieve a consensus about the basic question “How shall we live together?” Laws answer the question with standards of conduct, rules for proper procedure, and boundaries of what was acceptable behavior.  The law is thus a kind of fundamental social compact: it embodies agreement in the text--the very words--of any law.  Respect for such law, for such texts, is thus the foundation for the social solidarity of a people, guiding our unity against the whims and prejudices and disputes of the moment.  And thus the “rule of law” is superior to the “rule of man.”

Scalia knew that, in American Life, such rule is even more fundamental.  Our social solidarity does not come naturally to Americans.  We trace our roots to too many places; we emerge from too different cultures; we belong to too diverse races; we speak too many languages.  Even our shared national memories go back only a few generations.  Our nation of immigrants must find unity elsewhere then culture, or language, or race, or history.  And so we find it in the law, in the Constitution, which unites us by establishing the principals, the institutions, and the rights that we all share.  It is the Constitution which provides the unifying force that trumps (you should pardon the expression) all our differences.

This unifying function, Scalia knew, makes the Constitution our most sacred text--our “American scriptures.”  And that makes interpreting it a solemn responsibility.  In his view, that responsibility required a method of interpretation focused above all--or even only--on the text itself.  The aim was to determine “what did this text’s authors mean?” Any other meanings were either secondary or irrelevant.

But of course the practical result of this approach was to make Scalia one of the Supreme Court’s most conservative justices.  And it strikes me that many conservative Catholics find his approach equally attractive for interpreting things in Catholic life as well as American Life.  They prefer to stick to the texts of things, often taking them quite literally without reference to outside sources.

This is especially true when it comes to the documents of Vatican Council II (1962-1965).  Once the Council’s 16 documents were published in 1966, Catholics at all levels devoted untold hours to examining their texts.  And the impact of the Council has generally been determined by how the documents have been interpreted and explained.

Naturally those interpretations vary, and for 50 years three generations of Catholics have read the documents and come away with different meanings.  No wonder!  Compared to the U.S. Constitution, the documents of Vatican II are a dramatically more difficult interpretive challenge.  They cover hundreds of pages, they are translated from Latin originals into hundreds of languages, they draw on 20 centuries of thinking and practical experience, and they address not only constitutional workings of the world’s largest organization, but also its historical development, political system, practical procedures, and its priorities for the future.

This textual complexity was unavoidable, even necessary--but the results have been troubling.  Even 50 years later, no interpretation enjoys consensus.  Some Catholics view Vatican II calling for revolutionary change, while others see it affirming tradition.  Some find warrant for wide experimenting in liturgy, but others find a call to preserve Latin.  Some see justification for every for new moral teachings, but others find only permission to employ new wording for the old teachings.  Some see a historical watershed, others detect a call for continuity.

In most of these debates, all sides have invoked the Council’s texts to prove their case.  But this has not led to consensus, for the Council’s documents are so vast they provide--like the Bible itself--fuel for almost any position.

Personally, I have long believed that we cannot fully understand the work of Vatican II by focusing solely on the documents themselves. And Scalia’s death has forced me to clarify why.

Let’s began with an analogy: Vatican II is to its 16 documents as the Constitutional Convention is to the Constitution. 

In both cases, the texts we need to interpret are the products of a deliberative body--they were both “composed by committee” and then voted on.  Scalia argued that, once the members of the Constitutional Convention had committed their intentions to paper, our interpretation must be limited to what the text says.  Whether we agree or not, it is a reasonable position--and it has proven influential.  Even liberal justices have said of Scalia’s impact, “We are all textualists now.”

But this analogy limps, because the two cases are not exactly alike.  Here is the difference: for 50 years, Catholics have not quit talking (and debating) about “Vatican II”--meaning Vatican Council II.  But what is the last time you heard any one debate about the Constitutional Convention?  You see, Americans have always focused on the document, not the event that produced it.  But Catholics have always focused on the event, even if they never read the documents.

There are two reasons for this.  One is common sense: the Council was the biggest meeting in history: 2000 men gathering for four years in the glare of constant global publicity.  The second reason is more complicated, and has to do with how authority works in the Catholic Church.

The Roman Catholic Church is a hierarchical structure, with fairly centralized authority under the pope and Bishops.  But for Catholics, this authority is not supposed to be blind or arbitrary, for we believe that it enjoys the inspiring guidance of the Holy Spirit.  Thus, the Church’s authority always depends on the greater authority behind it: the will of God.

Now the highest ranking office is the pope, but even the pope’s authority is not as great as a general council, where the pope presides over the world’s bishops and they act together.  There have only been 21 such councils in Catholicism’s 20 centuries. By definition they are extraordinary events—events where, Catholics believe, the Spirit’s guidance is especially powerful.

For Catholics, what is sacred about Vatican II is not the documents themselves, but rather the Spirit’s presence, guiding the Church at that precise moment in history. In other words, it is in Vatican II as an event that we expect to find the Spirit working.  And this event was much greater than the documents it produced.  It began the moment Pope John XXIII conceived the idea of the Council within weeks of his election in 1958.  It continued through several years of preparations before the Council convened in October 1962.  It includes what John said about his intentions for the Council in speeches, interviews, and letters.  It includes the work of many commissions, the hundreds of speeches by the Council Fathers, the decision after John’s death to elect Paul VI, the working relationship between John and Paul, and Paul’s own statements during and after the council.

In short, we cannot interpret Vatican II’s meaning by looking only at its official texts.  To discern the divine guidance of the Spirit--to discover the sacred truth of the Council expressing the will of God--we must consider the entire event. Such consideration, far from complicating our interpretations, can actually clarify and simplify. 

For example, John XXIII more than once (including his speech opening the Council) called Vatican II “A New Pentecost” or even “A Second Pentecost.” Moreover, when John died and Paul VI was elected, he opened the Council’s next session (in October 1963) by quoting John about “The New Pentecost”! Since Pentecost marked the birth of the Church, John (and Paul) clearly intended Vatican II to bring about the rebirth of the Church.

 This was a lofty, historic, even heroic expectation--and no interpretation of Vatican II can leave it out. John’s vision, clearly grasped and embraced by his successor, must frame every interpretation of every text the Council produced.

 If the Catholic Church has not been “Reborn” in the last 50 years, then either we have failed to achieve the Council’s purpose, or we have never really understood (or accepted) it.

In sum, Antonin Scalia’s “textualism” is a plausible theory for interpreting the U.S. Constitution, for that document grounds our national unity even though we may not believe the Founding Fathers were divinely inspired.  But when Catholics interpret Vatican II, we affirm that the Council Fathers were divinely inspired, and so all their work--and not just the Texts they produced--demand our attention.

Thus we may say “Long Live the Constitution!” (meaning the text) but we also say “Long Live Vatican II” (meaning the event). In secular terms, we must honor not just the Council’s “legislation” but also its “legislative history.” After all, America is a nation of laws, but Catholics worship the God of history.

   © Bernard F. Swain PhD 2015

Tuesday, July 2, 2013

#395: The Burden of Proof--Part 2

How the new burden of proof challenges the Catholic Church to honor its own teachings.
 
Now that the Supreme Court has entered the same-sex marriage debate, we have reached a tipping point where voter opinion matters less than the constitutional question of how to justify discrimination that denies gays a civil right.
Now, suddenly, the burden of proof is on those defending the traditional definition of civil marriage.  Now, to make their case, they must prove Bishop Vigneron’s assertion that re-defining civil marriage will “hurt us all.”
Having the burden of proof means that mere assertions will no longer work. They will have to demonstrate concrete harmful consequences.
This is exactly the burden of proof that courts have been demanding for 10 years.  And it is the burden of proof that defenders of “one man and one woman” have been failing to meet in case after case.  So in 2003 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed the Department of Public Health’s case against gay marriage and concluded:
The department has had more than ample opportunity to articulate a constitutionally adequate justification for limiting civil marriage to opposite-sex unions. It has failed to do so…It has failed to identify any relevant characteristic that would justify shutting the door to civil marriage to a person who wishes to marry someone of the same sex….The absence of any reasonable relationship between, on the one hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples who wish to enter into civil marriage and, on the other, protection of public health, safety, or general welfare, suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against persons...
In this week’s DOMA case, the Supreme Court first noted that DOMA (Defense of Marriage Act) denied gay people their rights by discriminating against them:
The Act’s demonstrated purpose is to ensure that if any state decides to recognize same sex marriages, those unions will be treated as second-class marriages for purposes of Federal law.  This raises a most serious question under the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment….  DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States code.
It then noted the clear and concrete harm from such discrimination: cutting off gay couples from the benefits contained in more than 1000 Federal laws pertaining to “social security, housing, taxes, up to criminal sanctions, copyright, and veterans’ benefits,” as well as health care, bankruptcy, and even children’s benefits.
Next the court reiterated that denying such rights is a major constitutional violation:
DOMA is unconstitutional as the deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
Finally it concludes that no defender of DOMA had proved any justification for such a breach of rights:
DOMA singles out a class of persons…The Federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and injure.
Similarly, in the ruling about California’s Proposition 8, the Court failed to find justification for that law’s ban on gay marriage.  In fact, the absence of such proof led the Court to conclude that those defending the ban had no business in court at all--that is, no legal “standing”:
It is not enough that the party invoking the power of the court had a keen interest in the issue.  That party must also have “standing,” which requires, among other things, that it had suffered a concrete and particularized to injury….We find the petitioners do not have standing.
Once again, the point is that discrimination requires some extraordinary justification:
The equal protection clause requires the state to have a legitimate reason for withdrawing a right or benefit from one group but not others…This requires the litigant to prove that he has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to a challenge to conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
And, the Court concluded, the petitioner never met this burden of proof:
The only individuals who sought to appeal that order were petitioners, who had intervened in the district court.  But the district court had not ordered them to or refrained them from doing anything…. Here… The petitioners have no “direct stake” in the outcome of their appeal.
All this demand for proof of “concrete and particularized injury” could well be too high a burden of proof for Catholic officials to meet. Perhaps it is time that they remind themselves of two things: (1) The difference between civil marriage and the Sacrament of Matrimony, and (2) Catholic teaching on homosexuality.  Until now, the bishops’ strategy has ignored both.
Catholic teaching says homosexuals must be treated with the same respect and dignity as anyone else.  It condemns any “unjust” discrimination against gay people.  If we apply this teaching to the question of civil marriage after 10 years of debate, two things are clear.
First, it is now well established in American law that access to civil marriage is a civil right, which means laws banning gay couples from civil marriage deny gays their rights and are a form of discrimination.
Second, to continue supporting such bans the Catholic Church would need to prove that such discrimination is not “unjust,” since the Church itself condemns that.  It would have to argue that such discrimination is justified because of the harms caused by allowing same-sex civil marriage.  And to do that, it would need to come up with much stronger proof than the courts have seen so far. Is that possible?
Clearly the burden of proving such a case is heavy indeed.  It seems to me that church officials have now three choices:
(1) They can cling to the arguments they had been using for 10 years: pretending that civil marriage is the same as the Sacrament of Matrimony, (even though the first is administered by the priest acting as an agent of the state, and the second is administered by the couple acting as ministers of the Church), and pretending that any change will “hurt us all.” This option guarantees failure.
(2) Or, they can marshall better evidence showing  that redefining civil marriage to allow gay marriage creates concrete harm, and accept the burden of proving that to the American public and the courts.  Legally, this is the only way to stop gay marriage, now that they courts have determined that this is not a matter of majority will but a matter of civil rights. But proving such harm is a tall order, especially since 10 years of gay marriage have convinced growing millions of Americans that no harm has resulted. 
(3) Or, finally, they can acknowledge that civil marriage has taken a historical fork in the road that diverges from the Sacrament of Matrimony, creating two very different institutions—one a civil right governed by the U.S. Constitution, the other a sacrament governed by Catholic tradition.
They can get priests out of the civil marriage business (one wonders: why are they in it at all?). 
They can admit that banning gay civil marriage equals discrimination, and they can also admit that the burden of proof to justify such discrimination has become an impossible task. 
Thus they can conclude that allowing gays access to civil marriage is an act of justice that treats homosexuals with all the respect and dignity that Catholic teaching promises them.
Then the bishops can focus on strengthening the Sacrament of Matrimony, a task they seem to have forgotten.
  © Bernard F. Swain PhD 2013

 

Sunday, June 30, 2013

#394: The Burden of Proof--Part 1

The Supreme Court has shifted the burden of proof in the debate over same-sex marriage.

When I began writing CrossCurrents in 2003, America’s debate over same-sex marriage was just heating up.  Almost immediately, the American Catholic hierarchy made protection of the status quo on marriage a top priority.  They have spent 10 years losing ground, and this week’s Supreme Court rulings confirm what has been clear for some time: the burden of proof is now on the US Bishops and anyone else trying to resist this change.
My doubts about the bishops’ strategy are not new.  In my early CrossCurrents pieces on this issue, I advised that the bishops back civil unions for gays, as Pope Francis did in Argentina.  After the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court overturned a ban on civil marriage licenses for same-sex couples in 2003, I observed that it was time for the U.S.  Catholic Church to get out of the civil marriage business (in which priests act as agents of the state) while the getting was good, in order to focus on the Sacrament of Matrimony.  I wrote:

The bishops could have drawn a sharp line between “civil marriage” and the “Sacrament of Matrimony”. Then they could have defended the unique meaning of Christian marriage against evolving, secular versions of civil marriage. Instead, the bishops chose to meet the court on its own turf, arguing that the good of society depends on denying same-sex couples, and lobbying against any broadening of civil marriage.

Thus the bishops dug in their heels by talking about “marriage” as though civil marriage and sacramental Matrimony were the same institution, while launching scary warnings about the woes to follow us if gays were to marry one another.

Ten years later, the rising tide has eroded the bishops’ stand, yet they cling to the same losing strategy.  Immediately after the Supreme Court killed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) this week and reinstated a California court’s ruling in favor of gay marriage, Catholic bishops quickly sprung into reaction.  Predictably, they offered only more of the same losing strategy.

Archbishop Alan Vigneron of Detroit said:

Catholics and millions of our fellow citizens will continue to make the case…that marriage cannot be redefined, and that attempts to do so hurt us all.

And Archbishop Salvatore Cordileone of San Francisco hammered away on the theme of the “truth about marriage”:

The federal government ought to respect the truth that marriage is the union of one man and one woman, even where states fail to do so. The preservation of liberty and justice requires that all laws, federal and state, respect the truth, including the truth about marriage...The common good of all, especially our children, depends upon a society that strives to uphold the truth of marriage. Now is the time to redouble our efforts in witness to this truth.

The Bishops’ problem is very simple: by confusing the two institutions of matrimony and civil marriage, they’ve replaced the facts with wishful thinking.  They want to make their case on two grounds: (1) there is one unique, non-negotiable truth about “marriage,” and (2) changing our definition of marriage will “hurt us all.” But both these arguments have become less and less credible over time.

Actually, the “truth about marriage” argument was never very convincing.  It only worked as long as people pretended that “marriage” referred to one thing rather than two different institutions, as I wrote earlier:

Many Catholics can’t tell civil and sacramental marriage apart. They may not realize that in fact civil marriage is a great deal older than sacramental marriage: it existed in archaic cultures, in Egyptian and the Israelite cultures, in Greek and Roman cultures, all before St. Paul ever taught that marriage could be understood as a sign of Christ’s bond with his church. Civil marriage took various forms, with various rules (Israelite men were sometimes required to marry their brother’s widow; Roman men were permitted extra-marital sex with slave-women; Greek men were permitted extra-marital sex with boys). Such rules evolve even within a culture, of course: not long ago most states forbade marriage by mixed-race couples.

But while the Bishops failed to acknowledge this truth, Massachusetts Chief Justice Margaret Marshall stated it plainly in her landmark Goodrich opinion legalizing same-sex marriage:

We begin by considering the nature of civil marriage itself. Simply put, the government creates civil marriage. In Massachusetts, civil marriage is, and since pre-Colonial days has been, precisely what its name implies: a wholly secular institution…No religious ceremony has ever been required to validate a Massachusetts marriage.

The truth is that “civil marriage” is an invention of the government, and different governments have defined it differently for centuries.  Moreover, this re-defining has included the evolving recognition that civil marriage, unlike the Sacrament of Matrimony, is a civil right that people make claim access to as a matter of justice:

The benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death. The department states that "hundreds of statutes" are related to marriage and to marital benefits...It is undoubtedly for these concrete reasons, as well as for its intimately personal significance, that civil marriage has long been termed a "civil right."

Without the right to marry…one is excluded from the full range of human experience and denied full protection of the laws…Because civil marriage is central to the lives of individuals and the welfare of the community, our laws assiduously protect the individual's right to marry against undue government incursion. Laws may not "interfere directly and substantially with the right to marry…"There can be no prohibition of marriage except for an important social objective and reasonable means."

There are two consequences of this fact.  First, civil marriage is now being drawn into the general history of civil rights.  Second, this history now challenges Catholic teaching to practice what it preaches about the just treatment of homosexuals.

First, on general history, Marshall wrote:

The history of constitutional law "is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded."…This statement is as true in the area of civil marriage as in any other area of civil rights.

In this week’s DOMA case, the Supreme Court saw this at work as well in New York State:

The limitation of lawful marriage to heterosexual couples, which for centuries have been deemed both necessary and fundamental, came to be seen in New York and certain other states as an unjust exclusion…New York acted to enlarge the definition of marriage to correct what its citizens and elected representatives perceived to be an injustice they had not earlier known or understood.

This movement linking civil marriage to all other civil rights explains the rising tide of court decisions favoring a new definition of marriage.  For if keeping the “one man and one woman” definition means denying gay people in a civil right, the question arises: how can that be justified? It becomes a matter of justice.

This explains why the movement to accept same-sex marriage has been so rapid: from one state in 2003 to 13 and counting in 2013. Now 40% of gay Americans already have access to this civil right, and the rest are demanding to know why they should be denied their rights.

This has dramatically shifted the burden of proof away from those proposing change; they now have both the rhetoric and the reality of civil rights on their side.

NEXT: How the new burden of proof challenges the Church to honor its own teachings.

  © Bernard F. Swain PhD 2013

Saturday, January 26, 2013

#163: Finding Common Ground on Abortion

After yesterday's protests against Roe v. Wade in  Washington, DC, I am replaying this piece, written 7 years ago but sadly still up-to-date. 

    Last week marked 33 years since the Supreme Court’s landmark Roe V. Wade decision on abortion. And every year about this time, I get to thinking about our complex path on abortion over the last 40 years.
Over the years, I have always considered myself pro-life, but I have discovered that I do not always share the views of other “pro life” advocates.  Most public discussion of abortion quickly reduces itself to an ugly conflict between people who have no interest in understanding one another, in finding a common ground, or in working together to solve the challenge that abortion poses.
That is why my best memory concerns the conversation group I belong to.
For 11 years we’ve been gathering monthly to discuss a single topic for entire evening, but we did not choose “abortion” for nearly five years.
It turned out that we had been avoiding the issue, both as individuals and as a group. Some of us assumed there was no point in such a discussion, since most of us were Catholics and would all agree anyway. Others assumed just the opposite: that entrenched differences would surface immediately, so there would be no basis for dialogue. One way or another, we were all assuming that we would suffer the same kind of paralyzing stalemate we saw in the public forum.
But we were happily surprised by what actually happened. In fact, when the evening was over, we all agreed on two things: First, we had avoided the issue needlessly and for too long. Second, we had just engaged in the best discussion of abortion any of us had ever heard.
What surprised us most about the discussion, I think, was that though we had differences, none were so far apart that we could not even communicate.  In fact, we quickly found that we had a great deal of common ground bridging our differences.
First, we acknowledged torn feelings.  For all of us, the era of legal abortion has raised difficult challenges, manifested many tragic stories, and left us feeling helpless to resolve a conflict that has divided our country for 30 years.
Second, we shared a common frustration with both sides of the abortion debate. We agreed that most pro life advocates let self righteousness impede real communication and progress—but we also agreed us that most “pro choice” advocates let their militancy stop communication too. The result was that, no matter what our opinions about abortion itself, we did not feel comfortable allying with such people.
Third, we discovered that we shared a common negative attitude toward abortion itself. None of us thought of abortion as something good—though some of us believed it should remain legal. We all wished there were less need for it, less recourse to it. For all of us, in fact, the ideal seemed to be a world in which no one would seek an abortion, even if they had the legal right to do so.
Fourth, we agreed that resolving the conflict in our country would probably NOT come from the victory of one side over the other. Instead, we guessed there would be no peace on the abortion issue until both sides uncovered some common ground upon which to build a consensus.
Fifth, we identified a key question: how does one change the behavior of an entire nation? In other words, how does real social change occur when values are in conflict?
We found ourselves using the example of a behavior where dramatic change has occurred within the last generation: cigarette smoking. We all knew that the percentage of American smokers has been shrinking for more than 30 years. We wondered how this had been accomplished, and whether the secret to that success could offer some clues as to what to do about abortion.
What seemed obvious to us, on reflection, was that over the years smoking has gone from something that people took for granted (in their homes, in public places, in advertising, in the movies) to something that can only be qualified as “socially unacceptable behavior.”
We all remembered smoke-filled parties, Marlboro ads on TV, white clouds of cigarette smoke hanging over every hockey game, the regular ritual of emptying ashtrays as part of housecleaning or car-cleaning. Now the main image is different: smokers huddled shivering like refugees in the doorways of office buildings catching a quick cold smoke during wintertime coffee breaks. And we all knew that any sign of smoking among us would bring swift scolding from our own children, who had been raised (if not brainwashed) to see our smoking as dangerous for them.
We all agreed that this was a dramatic and positive shift in public values and behavior. We wondered how it happened, and whether the same thing could happen on abortion.
At the time, the Massachusetts state government was sponsoring anti-smoking ads on television using the slogan “Let’s Make Smoking History!” As we discussed the success of that PR campaign, we came to two conclusions.
The first was: those of us who wanted abortion to be illegal admitted that, as a matter of history, legal prohibition has not proved an effective way to change people’s behavior. The obvious example to contrast with cigarette smoking was the example of alcohol: the Prohibition Era had not ended drinking in America but had only driven it underground and into the hands of criminals. The unhappy truth is, the same was largely true of the history of the legal prohibition of abortion. We admitted that no law has ever eliminated abortion, but has only driven it underground.
The second conclusion was: it is possible to reduce or even eliminate unwanted behavior once it becomes generally regarded as “socially unacceptable behavior.” Once the social norm shifts, people feel pressured to find alternatives to such socially unacceptable behavior--even if it remains legal.
We found ourselves wondering why no one had ever tried a campaign to “Make Abortion History!” It seemed to us that here was real potential for common ground. Many people who consider themselves “pro choice” will insist that they are not pro abortion, and would support efforts to reduce or eliminate abortion as long as “choice” remained legal. In fact, many of us believed that large numbers of “pro choice” Americans would embrace any social movement that would relieve them of the unwelcome dilemma of defending abortion itself.
For this point of view, the main obstacle to dialogue appeared to be the insistence on arguing over legal prohibition vs. protection as the key element in debating the abortion question. We had found that discussing abortion itself (why we did not like it and how our society could end it) produced a much more constructive dialogue and a lot more common ground upon which to build a consensus for action.
For Catholics, this raises a crucial point. While Catholics are obliged to oppose abortion and seek its elimination, nothing in our faith tradition requires us to believe that legal prohibition is the only tool that can accomplish this goal—or it even to believe that it is an effective tool. Prohibition’s effectiveness is not a matter of faith or morals; it is simply a matter of historical fact.
One can hold that prohibition failed in the past, and would fail again in the future, and still be a good Catholic who believes we should find better ways to protect the unborn and build a culture of life.
For our little, private conversation group, the sad thing was that this: we had found common ground among ourselves, and we even felt the clear opportunity for further constructive dialogue—but as we adjourned for the evening we knew the progress we had made among ourselves still seemed totally absent in the public forum.
Thirty-three years after Roe V. Wade, I am afraid that is still the truth.
© Bernard F. Swain PhD 2006